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Visual Literacy vs. Visual Manipulation
PAUL MESSARIS

The concept of visual literacy appears to have originated in the notion that
visual communication depends on shared conventions which may be likened
productively to the syntactic and semantic conventions of spoken and written
language. Systematic treatments of this notion occur at least as early as the 1950s
in analytical writing about motion pictures, such as Raymond Spottiswoode's
Grammar of the Film (1950). As this title suggests, Spottiswoode's version of the
analogy between visual communication and language was expressed in the
formulation of "grammatical" rules, thought to account for the ways in which
meaning is created through visual composition and editing.
The attempt to explicate rules or regularities of this sort remains a concern in
film scholarship (for example, Bordwell et al., 1985; Carroll, 1980; Metz, 1974), as
well as work on other visual media (for example, Dondis, 1973; Saint-Martin,
1990; Prince, 1990; Zettl, 1990). The term visual "literacy" appears in writing on
this topic as a comprehensive label for the cognitive skills involved in the fluent
use of these visual "grammars." In an influential early definition, Debes describes
visual literacy as follows: "a group of vision competencies [that] enable a visually
literate person to discriminate and interpret . . . visible actions, objects, and/ or
symbols .... Through the creative use of these competencies, [a person] is able to
communicate with others. Through the creative use of these competencies [the
person] is able to comprehend and enjoy the masterworks of visual
communication" (Debes, 1970, p. 1).
As Debes's statement makes clear, scholarly writing about visual literacy
initially emphasized its cognitive and aesthetic implications. This emphasis is
characteristic of much subsequent scholarship (for example, Braden et al., 1993;
Curtiss, 1987; Foss and Kanengieter, 1991; Metallinos, 1992). At the same time,
however, the scope of visual-literacy studies has been broadened to include an
additional, relatively distinct issue, namely, the possibility that visual literacy may
be a means of counteracting the influence of visual media on their viewers. More
specifically, it has been argued that an understanding of how visual communication
works--how visual conventions are used to create meaning and to elicit responses
from viewers-may make a person better able to resist the power of television and
other visual media (see Brown, 1991; Kubey & Ruben, in press; Lewis, 1992; see
also Gomery, 1993, p. 45, for a discussion of visual literacy as an alternative to
media censorship). In short, this formulation sees visual literacy as a means of
defense against visual manipulation. It is this view that will be the focus of the
following discussion.

The elements of this defensive aspect of visual literacy vary somewhat,
depending on which particular type of visual manipulation is at issue. In the case of
advertising and other persuasive uses of visual media, one set of studies has sought
to specify the nature of the manipulative devices that might be known by visually
literate viewers. Related research has examined the extent to which various
categories of viewers are aware of the devices in question. However, a different
line of argument has focused on advertising techniques that purportedly elude
conscious perception-and may therefore be impervious to "literate" viewing.
An emphasis on covert (and, by implication, potentially undetectable)
practices has also been characteristic of much recent writing on the ostensibly
informational uses of visual media. Of particular concern have been two forms of
visual fabrication: first, the computer-assisted alteration of photographs; second,
the staging of photographic images that are subsequently presented as authentic
documents. In both cases, discussion has centered on how awareness of the
possibility of fabrication might affect viewers' beliefs about the relationship
between photography and reality. Similar questions have been raised about another
feature of the visual media's documentation of reality, namely, its inevitable
selectivity.
The kinds of concerns described thus far-issues of visual persuasion and
visual misinformation-have also played a part in scholarship dealing with the
broader social consequences and ideological implications of visual communication.
However, because much of this scholarship has focused on fictional genres, it has
investigated an additional topic that may be less relevant to the study of advertising
or news, that is, the illusion of reality that certain forms of visual fiction seek to
cultivate in their viewers. Operating on the assumption that this illusion encourages
an unquestioning acceptance of a film or TV program's ideological premises, some
researchers have investigated how viewers respond to the visual devices on which
the illusion is thought to depend.
The following discussion examines visual literacy in reference to each of the
areas of concern outlined above: visual persuasion, visual misinformation, and the
illusion of reality in visual fiction. However, the discussion is also motivated by a
question cutting across all three areas: What are the social consequences of the
ways in which scholars, journalists, and other commentators have framed public
discussions of visual manipulation and visual literacy? This question will be
addressed most directly in the discussion’s concluding section.
Visual Persuasion
Positioning the viewer

A standard illustration of the idea that visual conventions are like a language
is the familiar compositional device of varying the angle of view in order to affect
viewers' perceptions of the power of a person in an image. According to this
traditional usage, low angles of view, which create the effect of looking up at
someone, enhance the image's implications of power, while high angles do the
opposite. This relationship between form and meaning is one of the most regular
and stable conventions of visual communication (although it is, of course,
inevitably dependent on context; cf. Bordwell and Thompson, l986). It is
presumably such characteristics that have led writers to describe this and other
conventions as constituting a visual language or grammar.
Pursuing the comparison with language further, Dyer has argued that a
viewer’s ability to make sense of this device must result from prior exposure, from
the fact that "we have learned the codes and conventions of television and film
practice" (Dyer, 1989, p. 131). But here the linguistic metaphor has probably been
stretched too far. In the case of language, prior learning is a prerequisite of
interpretation because the connections between sound and meaning are arbitrary.
However, the angle-of-view convention is a relatively clear instance of a nonarbitrary, analog relationship between form and meaning. It derives its significance
by replicating the form (and, hence, some of the implications) of a real-world
visual experience (looking up at someone vs. looking down at her/him). This
analog quality suggests that a viewer's ability to understand the angle-of-view
convention may be less dependent on prior learning than is linguistic
comprehension. Precisely for this reason, however, it could be argued that this
convention is a particularly good example of the need for the defensive kind of
visual literacy that is the focus of this discussion. The more transparent a
convention is, the less viewers may be aware of it. For example, a verbal slogan
proclaiming a politician "a strong leader" may be a more obvious persuasive
device-- to some people--than a campaign picture showing her/him from a low
angle.
Viewers' awareness of angle of view in a political context was explored by
Mandell and Shaw (1973), in an early experimental study of this convention.
College students attending introductory classes in a department of radio, television,
and film were asked to make judgments about a political figure appearing in a
newscast. There were three versions of this person's image: one taken at eye level,
the others at angles of twelve degrees below or above his eyes. The students'
ratings of how powerful the person looked varied according to which of the three
versions they were shown. As expected, lower angles led to higher ratings. It
turned out, though, that most of the students did not seem conscious of the
influence of angle of view. At the conclusion of the study, they were asked directly
to comment about camera angles used in the newscast. Out of a total of 78 students

who saw either the high- or the low-angle versions, only thirteen showed some
awareness of this device in their responses (Mandell and Shaw, 1973, p. 362).
What makes this finding especially interesting is that these students, all
enrolled in media courses, can presumably be regarded as relatively "literate"
viewers, compared to the broader public. This feature of the study gives added
force to its implications regarding the unobtrusiveness of visual conventions. On
the other hand, it is conceivable that some of the students did notice the high or
low angle but did not consider it worthy of comment. It is also conceivable that,
despite their interest in media studies, some noticed the angle but could not express
their awareness because of a lack of familiarity with technical terminology. In
research of this sort, the latter possibility poses a recurring methodological
obstacle.
The angle-of-view convention can be considered part of a larger family of
visual devices having to do with how the viewer is positioned relative to the people
or objects in an image. (See Meyrowitz, 1986, for a general theoretical treatment of
this area of visual communication.) A prominent member of this family of devices
is the subjective shot, which simulates the point of view of one of the characters in
a movie, TV program, or commercial. This kind of shot positions the viewer
"inside" the action on the screen, and has traditionally been considered a means of
eliciting identification with the character through whose eyes the action is shown.
The use of subjective camera was studied by Galan (1986), who showed
viewers three versions of a commercial in which two characters discuss the merits
of a new (fictitious) product. One version presents the action through the eyes of a
person praising the product. The second version gives the point of view of the
person listening to these comments. In the third version, the action is presented
without any subjective shots. As Galan expected, the two subjective versions were
received more favorably than the third version. For present purposes, the more
notable finding of this study had to do with the viewers' understanding of the visual
variable being manipulated. Each viewer initially saw only one of the three
versions of the commercial. After responding in detail to that one version, viewers
were shown the other two and asked to describe the differences among them.
Although the viewers were all marketing students and probably more
knowledgeable about advertising than most people, only a minority referred
explicitly to the fact that the two subjective versions were meant as representations
of someone's point of view.
As testimony about educated people's lack of visual literacy, this finding
could be considered even more revealing than that of Mandell and Shaw, since
Galan's viewers could compare different applications of the variable they were
being asked about (although, unlike Mandell and Shaw's viewers, they were not
given any indication of what kind of device to look for). As with Mandell and

Shaw, however, Galan's procedure for investigating awareness raises obvious
methodological questions that make it difficult to take the results entirely at face
value. Moreover, as will be seen presently, similar problems of method have also
bedeviled other attempts to study viewers' understanding of the persuasive uses of
visual conventions.
Associational Juxtaposition of Images
Although the studies examined above provide a suggestive first view of the
scope and some limitations of empirical research on visual literacy, the
conventions examined in those studies usually play a subsidiary role as persuasive
devices. The primary role in the visual organization of much political advertising
and most commercial advertising is played by the device of associational
juxtaposition. As Craig has pointed out in an examination of the origins of
contemporary advertising practices, the use of visual imagery in commercial
advertising has traditionally been guided by assumptions borrowed from
behaviorist psychology (Craig, 1992, pp. 166-170). In particular, it has been
assumed that attitudes toward a product can be shaped by juxtaposing its picture
with other images. This "Pavlovian" notion of the transfer of meaning through
association has been embraced openly in the advertising literature (see Stout,
1984).
Empirical support for this notion has come from a variety of sources. The
general proposition that a viewer's responses to an object can be conditioned
through visual association has been confirmed most memorably in a pair of
experiments (Rachman, 1966; Rachman and Hodgson, 1968) in which
associational juxtaposition was used to turn viewer into boot fetishists. As far as
the specific area of advertising is concerned, what is commonly considered the
definitive demonstration of the efficacy of associational juxtaposition was provided
by Mitchell, in two related studies (Mitchell, 1986; Mitchell and Olson, 1981). In
these studies, pictures of products were paired with a variety of images; as
expected, viewers' ratings of the products corresponded to the particular pairing
that they were shown. Correspondences of this sort have also been obtained in a
non-laboratory situation by Zuckerman (1990), who compared one group of
viewers' judgments about real products with a matched group's judgments about
the associational imagery used in exiling advertising for those products.
Viewers' awareness of associational juxtaposition was examined by Messaris
and Nielsen (1989). This study dealt with the use of visual association as an editing
strategy in TV advertising. As Prince (1990) has pointed out, television advertisers
have resurrected an editing device that was relatively common in early Soviet
cinema, as well as other films of the 1920s and 1930s, but has since all but

disappeared from the fictional screen. The device in question consists of cutting
back and forth between the principal subject of a scene and omit other image: for
example, in Eisenstein's Strike (1925), cross-cutting between a massacre' of
striking workers and the butchering of animals in a slaughterhouse. In its rebirth as
a TV advertising convention. This cross-cutting strategy has been employed for
associational purposes both in commercials and in political ads.
Messaris and Nielsen's study was based on two examples of associational
crosscutting. The first example was the opening scene of a political campaign
video, "A New Beginning," used in the promotion of Ronald Reagan's re-election
in 1984. In the extract used in the study, Ronald Reagan's first-term inauguration is
intercut with early-morning images of people going to work. As Morreale noted in
a detailed analysis of this scene, the cross-cutting expresses the video's overall
theme, namely, that Reagan's first term in office was a time of economic and
spiritual renewal (Morreale, 1991, pp. 71-75). The second example of associational
juxtaposition used in the study was a commercial for a popular brand of fruit
preserves, in which pictures of the product are intercut with images of rural life,
suggesting wholesomeness and traditional values.
In an attempt to assess the perceptions of people with different levels of
education and visual literacy, the study included three groups of viewers: people
without a college education; people with a college education; people employed
professionally in TV production. Each viewer was shown one of the two examples
of cross-cutting and asked to describe what she/he thought the intention of the
sequence was. The primary question guiding the analysis of the responses was
whether a viewer made any reference to an intended conceptual connection
between the candidate or product and the intercut imagery (for example, "It's an
attempt to relate Ronald Reagan with down-home American values"). Such
references appeared as follows: among the viewers without college education, 22
percent in the case of the Reagan campaign video and 50 percent in the case of the
fruit-preserve commercial; among the college-educated viewers, 59 percent in the
case of the Reagan video and 100 percent in the case of the commercial; and,
among the TV professionals, 87 percent in the case of the Reagan video and 100
percent in the case of the commercial.
Once again, the use of a verbal method of assessing viewers' perceptions
makes it difficult to be entirely confident about these findings. One cannot discount
the possibility that the relatively low frequencies recorded among the less-educated
viewers are due at least partly to a lack of a suitable vocabulary, rather than
absence of awareness of the associational aspects of the editing. Even some of the
more-educated viewers may have been hampered by unfamiliarity with technical
terms. In view of these reasons for skepticism, perhaps the most prudent approach
to these findings would be to treat them as indicators of issues that could be

explored further through more suitable (less verbal) methods. Nonetheless, it is
worth asking what the implications of the findings would be if they were taken at
face value.
All the evidence reviewed so far could be seen as supporting the position of
educators and others who have argued for more public attention to problems of
visual literacy. However, in certain respects this appearance of congruence may be
misleading. Arguments about the need for visual literacy are often predicated on
the claim that the visual devices used in advertising and other forms of potential
manipulation evade awareness because of their complexity and deviousness. (Such
arguments will be considered further below.) But it is important to emphasize that
the devices examined in all three studies discussed here are in fact among the most
rudimentary of visual conventions. In other words, rather than demonstrating any
great subtlety in the visual means available to advertisers and propagandists, these
studies actually suggest that many viewers may overlook even relatively obvious
visual tactics. This point should be kept in mind in the following section of this
discussion, in which the focus shifts to arguments about subterfuge in visual
persuasion.
Covert Persuasion
Since the publication of Vance Packard's The Hidden Persuaders (1957),
public discourse about advertising has frequently been framed as a defensive
reaction against sophisticated, scientifically-informed techniques deliberately
designed to avoid detection. This model of visual persuasion is especially likely to
be encountered in mass-market publications, but it is by no means absent from the
more scholarly literature on advertising practices. A recurring focus of arguments
driven by this model is the issue of subliminal persuasion. Indeed, this kind of
device is probably the canonical example of public conceptions about visual
subterfuge.
Concern about subliminal advertising first surfaced into public awareness in
1957, when a market researcher's speculations about the effectiveness of brief,
unconsciously-perceived messages, surreptitiously embedded in movies, were
mistakenly reported as facts. Since then, the topic has been popularized in a series
of publications by Wilson Bryan Key (1973, 1976, 1981, 1989). Key's descriptions
of techniques of subliminal persuasion have tended to deal with print media more
than with film or television. For example, in the introductory chapter of his most
recent book he invites the reader to scrutinize an ad for Tanqueray gin that
reportedly appeared in Time magazine and other national periodicals. The ad
portrays a stream of gin flowing into a glass. According to Key, if one isolates a
certain section of this design, one notices that a "formidable, erect, male genital has

been embedded into the gin stream" (Key, 1989, p. 15). Similarly, he makes the
following observation about the icing in an ad for Betty Crocker Super Moist cake
mix: “Any standard anatomy text will confirm that the shape painted into the icing
is an accurate tumescent female genital. 'Super Moist,' at the portrayed state of
excitation, constitutes a normal physiological event” (p. 17).
Specific interpretations of this sort are perhaps best considered matters of
individual judgment. There may also be toward the general premise from which
such techniques presumably stem, viz., the idea that elements of a visual design
can evoke acontextual interpretations to which viewers respond without being
aware of them. The assumption that an image's graphic shapes are meaningful in
themselves is of course a commonly- accepted tenet in psychologically oriented
theories of art (for example, Arnheim, 1988; Bang. 1991), and this assumption has
been supported by applied research in graphic design (Espy. 1983). There is also
empirical support for assuming that certain abstract shapes are commonly-perhaps
even cross-culturally- perceived as connoting femininity or masculinity (for
example, see Fischer, 1961), and research on stylistic features of television
commercials has shown that such abstract features as editing rhythm are capable of
connoting gender to children (Huston et al., 1984; Welch et al., 1979).
In certain respects, then, beliefs in the efficacy of subliminal persuasion can
be said to rest on foundations that are not particularly controversial. On the other
hand, at least one element in these beliefs clearly goes beyond these more
traditional conceptions of viewers' responses to visual media. In the research cited
above, the graphic or other formal features that were tested were, in all cases,
openly available for the viewer's inspection- even if some viewers were not
consciously aware of them; in subliminal advertising, on the other hand, embedded
objects or words are typically camouflaged or presented only very faintly. In order
to work, therefore, a subliminal ad of this sort would have to elicit not only
unconscious perception but also unconscious decipherment of a visual puzzle. This
aspect of visual persuasion has been tested in a number of studies, and the results
were generally negative (see Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992, for a review).
Still, even if one were to accept fully the possibility that subliminal
persuasion does work, another aspect of the matter may ultimately have more
import for understanding social perspectives on visual manipulation and visual
literacy. Subliminal advertising has been expressly condemned by more than one
government agency, and except for occasional examples offered by Key and other
writers, there is no evidence that it is even a marginal practice among mainstream
advertisers. Under the circumstances, the continuing public receptivity to authors
such as Key (all of whose books are still in circulation) must be seen as something
other than a reasoned response to actual experiences of deception.

The introduction to Key's latest book contains the following claim about the
book's benefits: ''The ideas and information can be used by anyone in a media
dominated environment to protect themselves against exploitation by picture and
word symbols" (Key, 1989, p. xvii). This is a typical example of visual-literacy
advocacy. But the concern for visual literacy has been directed against a rare,
perhaps largely imaginary, form of manipulation, even though there is no reason to
assume a general public awareness of the more basic manipulative conventions
(and, as noted above, some weak grounds for assuming the contrary). In other
words, without any evidence (or even contrary to the evidence), the attainment of
visual literacy has been cast as a confrontation with a highly devious-but almost
nonexistent-antagonist, instead of a more simple-but ubiquitous-one. This seeming
paradox will be encountered again when this discussion addresses issues of visual
fabrication and misinformation. This paradox is also present, to a certain extent, in
the more academically oriented advertising literature.
With a few exceptions (for example, Ewen, 1988, pp. 48, 51), scholarly
analyses of advertising have not been concerned with subliminal imagery in the
sense described above. Instead, they have tended to scrutinize the overt contents of
images in search of implicit meanings (as opposed to embedded objects). For
instance, such analyses may treat the elongated shapes of cigarettes, bottles, or
other objects as phallic symbols (see Wernick, 1991, pp. 41, 60-61, 76-77). The
psychoanalytic approach informing much of this literature is illustrated explicitly
in Haineault and Roy's (1993) analysis of a print ad for Rolex Cellini watches.
Noting the juxtaposition of a watch with a statue (attributed implicitly to
Benvenuto Cellini), the authors observe: "The representation 'watch' refers to the
measurement of time, to limitation, and to noneternity, in other words, to the
mortality, corporeality, and narcissistic castration of the subject" (Haineault and
Roy, 1993, p. 48). The statue, on the other hand, represents the timeless perfection
of art. But (their analysis goes on to say) it can also be seen as the effigy on a
tomb, while the gold watch can itself be seen as a work of art, and thus, through a
combination of displacement and denial, negative can be transformed into positive.
Thus, what could be taken as a straightforward attempt to associate a product with
the desirable qualities of a work of art (a standard practice in the advertising of
luxury items) is treated, in this analysis, as a complex ensemble of repressed
meanings and redirected drives.
Similar complexity is often attributed to advertising imagery by critics
concerned more directly with ideological matters. In analyzing an ad for Gucci No.
3 perfume, Stuart Ewen cites Bakhtin for the notion that formal classicism in
works of art serves to "naturalize" hierarchical social orders by reinforcing such
values as permanence, order, and exclusivity. Ewen applies this notion to the
perfume ad, in whose "cool, porcelain tone" he sees "a depiction of beauty that has

served the interests of exclusive power for centuries" (Ewen, 1988, p. 86). In other
words, according to this analysis, the seductive formal qualities of this image have
the effect of inveigling viewers into an acceptance of metaphorically equivalent
formal qualities-stability, hierarchy-in the social world.
Referring specifically to the work of Judith Williamson (1978) and Michael
Geis (1982), Cook has argued that ideological critics of advertising tend to devalue
the critical abilities of ordinary viewers, who are seen as "vulnerable and easily
deceived" (1992, p. 205). But what seems more remarkable is these critics' high
estimation of advertising practitioners' psychological perspicacity and tactical
elusiveness. It is interesting to compare this conception of the advertising industry
with what practitioners themselves say in describing what they do (Antin, 1993;
Ind, 1993; Wolf, 1988). Although references to motivational research and the
collective unconscious and patriarchal culture are certainly not absent from this
literature (see Randazzo, 1993, pp. 35, 90, 172-174), David Ogilvy's (1983, p. 14)
advice is probably more representative: "It pays to give most products an image of
quality .... This is particularly true of products whose brand-name is visible to your
friends, like beer, cigarettes and automobiles." Michael Schudson's discussions
with advertising professionals suggest that the creation of individual
advertisements is typically guided by informal, intuitive understandings rather than
by any existing theories of advertising which, in any case, contain very few
specific guidelines for "visually oriented strategies" (Schudson, 1984, pp. 84-85).
As an expression of psychological intuition, Ogilvy's statement-which encapsulates
the concepts of associational juxtaposition and conspicuous consumption in two
sentences-is hardly simpleminded. But the process it envisions is not easy to
reconcile with the indirectness and circuitousness assumed in much scholarly
writing about advertising. A similar emphasis on devious, hard-to detect forms of
manipulation is present in recent scholarly and critical writing about visual
misinformation, discussed next.
VISUAL MISINFORMATION
The Alteration of Photographic Images
Since the early 1980s, the communication industry's processing of photographs has
increasingly relied on digital imaging technology, which entails the electronic
encoding of images for purposes of storage, transmission, or computer assisted
alteration. The latter process has become particularly controversial as its use has
spread. It has been calculated that by 1989 ten percent of all color photographs
published in the United States were altered in some way by computer (Wall Street
Journal estimate, cited in W. Mitchell, 1992, p. 16). This practice originated as an
extension of earlier routine procedures (for example, re-touching, color-correction,

and so forth). but the greater precision and wider variety of the changes enabled by
new technology have elicited increased levels of scrutiny.
In addition to surveying the history of digital imaging technology and
explaining its technical aspects, William Mitchell (1992) provides a useful
overview of the applications of this technology that can raise questions of
misinformation and visual falsehood. He groups these potentially problematic
applications into three general categories: (1) insertions, exemplified by a Newsday
cover photo in which a single fighter jet's image was pasted repeatedly into a
scene, giving the impression of an entire formation of jets flying in unison (pp.
196, 200); (2) effacements and elisions, for example, the deletion of a shoulder
holster and pistol from a Rolling Stone cover photograph of a TV cop show star (p.
202); (3) substitutions, such as the grafting of Oprah Winfrey's head onto the body
of Ann-Margret in a TV Guide cover image (p. 209). Mitchell also mentions
another kind of alteration, which might be termed rearrangement, for example, the
February, 1982, cover of National Geographic, in which two Egyptian pyramids
were shifted closer together in order to enhance the aesthetic appeal of the
photograph (p. 16).
Critical discussion of such practices has dealt extensively with their
implications for viewers' attitudes about the truth value of photographs. In a widely
cited account, Fred Ritchin, former director of photography of the New York Time
Magazine, gives his reaction to a manipulated photograph that appeared in
Newsweek on January 16, 1989. The photograph showed the two stars of the film
Rain Man standing next to each other. Some two weeks after the picture's
publication Ritchin discovered that this image was a composite, put together from
two individual photographs. Ritchin responds: ''I felt not only misled but
extraordinarily shaken, as if while intend observing the world it had somehow still
managed to signify change without my noticing." In reference to photography in
general, he adds that "now the viewer must question the photograph at the basic
physical level of fact" (Ritchin, 1990, p. 9; see also Harris, 1991, p. 167).
The vehemence of this reaction is not unusual. The kind of radical attitudinal
shift that Ritchin recalls experiencing has been forecast for the general public in
other writers' analyses (Brand et al., 1985; Grundberg, 1990; Harris, 1991; Martin,
1991; W. Mitchell, 1992). The shared assumption behind such forecasts is that the
public has hitherto viewed photographs as direct, unimpeachable records of reality;
and that growing public awareness of digital imaging practices will eventually lead
to a collapse of faith in the entire medium. Intense concern about how to avoid this
outcome has been expressed both by academic observers (for example, Bossen,
1985) and by journalists directly involved with the computer manipulation of
images (see Lasica, 1989).

The first thing to be said about these expressions of concern, especially
when they come from the world of academic scholarship, is that there is a certain
element of self-contradiction in them. In academic writing on photography, the
broad public's supposed faith in the medium has commonly been viewed as "naïve
realism,'' and considerable effort has gone into undermining its foundations. In
fact, a persistent and broad-based attack on photography's documentary status has
traditionally been a central theme of photographic criticism (For example, Curtis,
1989; Freund, 1980; Snyder, 1980)-as Ritchin himself acknowledges elsewhere in
his book (Ritchin, 1990, pp. 81ft). Under these circumstances, one might have
expected that predictions of a widespread loss of faith in photography would be
greeted with approval, as evidence that "photographic literacy" was finally about to
spread to the many from the few.
This point leads to a related observation. One of the many underpinnings of
the "anti-realist" tradition in photographic scholarship has been the fact that
photographs could always be altered, often in ways that were as convincing as the
results of today's computer-based techniques. Earlier methods of alteration have
been described in some detail by Jaubert (1989, pp. 9-14), in the introduction to a
major study of the use of these methods by totalitarian regimes. Among the various
forms of alteration discussed in this study, perhaps the most striking is the visual
obliteration of political figures who had fallen from favor or lost leadership
struggles--for instance, the elimination of Leon Trotsky from a 1920 photograph of
Lenin, following Trotsky's exile and murder under Stalin; the removal of Liu
Shaoqi from a photograph of Mao, after Liu had been tortured and killed during the
Cultural Revolution; and the effacement, from a picture of Fidel Castro, of a
former associate who went into exile following Castro's support of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia (Jaubert, 1989, pp. 30-31, 116, 160, respectively).
It is instructive to compare these examples with the kinds of alterations
addressed in criticism of digital imaging. Most of this criticism has dealt with the
cases mentioned earlier, in connection with Mitchell's category system, and with
such other examples as the removal of a Diet Coke can from the picture of a
Pulitzer Prize winner celebrating his award (see Christians et al., 1991, pp. 61-64).
Even though this incident and the ones cited by Mitchell may seem relatively
insignificant-at least in contrast to those described by Jaubert-the effacement of the
Coke can was "hotly debated" by the staff of the newspaper in which the picture
was published. The paper's policy for news photographs now prohibits any
computer manipulation for purposes of "moving, eliminating, or adding elements"
(Christians et al., 1991, pp. 61, 64). Formally or informally, similar approaches
have been adopted at other major publications, although editors have typically
reserved the right to make more substantial changes in photographs used outside of
news or documentary contexts (Reaves, 1991).

The attention received by the Coke can erasure and other arguably minor
episodes could be seen as evidence of the extreme scrupulousness informing the
news media's processing of images. From another perspective, however, this
evidence becomes more questionable, and any confidence it might inspire appear
somewhat spurious. As Christians et al. make clear in their presentation of the
Coke can picture before and after its alteration (1991, p. 62), the removal could
have been achieved by cropping. The can could also have been omitted if the initial
photograph had been taken from a slightly different angle in the first place. Unlike
cropping or other means of post-facto alteration, this aspect of photographic
"manipulation" – selectivity in angle of representation or in choice among images is an inevitable element in any act of picture taking; and, in contrast to these other
practices, it is an act that would be much more difficult to regulate through hardand-fast rules.
From these considerations emerge two questions that visual-literacy
scholarship has not yet addressed adequately and that therefore suggest directions
for future research: To what extent has the occasional publicity surrounding image
alteration (perhaps most notably the case of the TV Guide Oprah Winfrey cover)
actually led to a broader awareness about techniques of photographic
manipulation? Conversely, to what extent have editors' public commitments to
avoid computer alteration of news photographs resulted in a (possibly
unwarranted) increase in viewers' confidence regarding the veracity of massmediated visual information?
The Staging of Photographic Images
Critical examination of the alteration of photographs is often accompanied by
concern over another form of potential misinformation, the presentation of staged
images as if they were authentic. Fred Ritchin's discussion of the composite
Newsweek photo also mentions one of the most controversial instances of staging,
an ABC news program's unlabeled "re-enactment" of an alleged spying incident
involving the transfer of a briefcase from a U.S. citizen to a Soviet agent (Ritchin,
1990, p. 26). This episode drew criticism not only for the unacknowledged staging
but also because the staged scene turned out to contain inaccuracies (for example,
the actual incident occurred in a different location from the one shown in the '"reenactment"; see Schorr, 1989, p. 47). The staging of "news" was also the focus of
considerable attention in a more recent case, a "Dateline NBC" broadcast whose
images of a G.M. truck catching fire in a collision had been created by rigging the
truck with hidden explosives (Carter, 1993). General Motors responded by
withdrawing its advertising from all NBC News programs, but the ensuing
publicity is said to have increased "Dateline NBC's" ratings (Zurawik and Stoehr,

1993, p. 30). It was subsequently revealed that similar tampering with vehicles has
occurred repeatedly in other TV news stories on car and truck safety (Olson, 1993).
Beyond its use in "news" contexts, staging has come to be seen as
problematic because of the increasing variety of television formats for which
traditional labels of "reality" or "fiction" no longer seem applicable: "Today,
distinctions between TV news, info-tainment programs, docu-dramas, historically
based' miniseries. or other forms of fictional television entertainment may be less
clear than we have assumed" (Griffin, 1992, p. 124). Furthermore, there is a
lengthy record of unacknowledged or boundary-blurring staging in political
advertising (Jamieson, 1992, pp. 147ft). This history includes: the Hollywood
industry's use of faked film of left-wing immigrants in an attempt to discredit
socialist Upton Sinclair's campaign for governor of California (G. Mitchell, 1992);
the staging of enthusiastic studio-audience responses in the TV shows that formed
a large part of Richard Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign (McGinnis, 1969); and
the intercutting of staged and documentary images in Ronald Reagan's 1984
campaign advertising (Morreale, 1991). Finally, visual fabrication of a different
sort has been an issue in the case of pictures produced for scholarly purposes, and
there is a sizable literature on the staging of ethnographic and other "documentary"
images (Jacknis, 1984; Lyman, 1982; Scherer, 1975).
Whereas the computerized alteration of images is commonly assumed to be
virtually undetectable (so long as it conforms to criteria of plausibility), viewers'
awareness of the presence of unacknowledged staging is a more open issue.
Cialdini (1993) has argued that simulating natural behavior is not always easy and
that certain kinds of staging should therefore be obvious to the viewer. He cites in
particular the use of supposedly unrehearsed-but, in his view, "blatantly phony"testimonials in TV commercials.All the same, the more typical assumption in
critical commentary is that simulations do deceive viewers (Linn, 1991; Saltzman,
1989; Slattery and Tiedge, 1992), and there is no shortage of supportive anecdotes,
such as the case of an actor who was mistakenly turned in to the authorities after
portraying a fugitive in a TV "re-enactment" (Zoglin, 1989, p. 98).
As these examples suggest, it seems reasonable to suppose that awareness of
staging may depend in part on the context. This possibility seems an appropriate
candidate for future research on visual literacy. That viewers tend to be more alert
to the possibility of deception in advertising than in other contexts is perfectly
conceivable. Moreover, since some forms of "reality-based" programming are
relatively recent developments, it may be that viewers have not yet formed stable
interpretive frameworks for dealing with such material. As Gross (1985) has
pointed out, experienced viewers may operate on the basis of a complex set of
distinctions regarding the degree and kind of staging (or other manipulation)
present in any particular genre.

What happens when viewers do become aware of staging? To a certain
extent, scholarly and journalistic commentary on this point has paralleled the
criticism of alteration reviewed above. In particular, it has been predicted that the
increasingly frequent presence of "reenactments" and other kinds of staged
material in the news may lead to a general erosion of the public's faith in news
images (Saltzman, 1989). Slattery & Tiedge (1992) asked viewers to judge the
credibility of staged news segments with or without labels acknowledging the
staging. The use of such labels was not found to have any consequences for
viewers' judgments about individual news segments (which were presumably taken
as authentic when the labels were absent). However, ratings of credibility did go
down when viewers were shown a program in which more than one story was
labelled as having been staged.
As in the case of alteration, one's attitude toward such a finding, and toward
the more general prediction that it supports, will presumably depend on one's
beliefs about the appropriate degree of faith that the news deserves in the first
place. The strong position that some broadcasters have taken against staging in the
news mirrors the position of newspapers toward alteration, and may be questioned
on similar grounds. As Lee and Solomon put it, referring to the "brouhaha over TV
news 'simulations' '': "Widespread condemnation of this practice has been ironic,
given that so much of the news blurs fact and fiction on a routine basis. When
programs like CBS' Saturday Night with Connie Chung air contrived footage of
supposedly real events, they are re-enacting what happens regularly--albeit more
subtly--on network news broadcasts" (1990, p. 336). Similarly, Weiss (1989, p. 42)
has charged that "for all their fulminating against the tabloids, mainstream
newscasters haven't set a noble standard."
These comments may be interpreted at two levels. Most obviously, they
point to the existence of forms of fabrication that may be less clearly manipulative
than simulations--but are likely to be more pervasive. For one thing, much of what
appears in the news has been shaped by the participants themselves to fit the
expectations of news organizations (cf. Day, 1991, p. 85). Perhaps more
significantly, though, even the most "authentic" material is always and necessarily
subject to one form of unavoidable authorial intrusion, namely, selection (in terms
of framing, angle of view, choice among competing perspectives, and so forth).
The issue of selection will be examined further in the next section of this
discussion. For the moment, it should be added that Weiss's and Lee and
Solomon's comments about these matters also imply that an over-emphasis on the
consequences of staging may have the effect of diverting attention away from the
latter practices.
In a broader sense, however, these writers' comments may be read as a
challenge to the very distinction between authentic and staged behavior. Lee &

Solomon's point about the blurring of fact and fiction echoes a related view,
namely, that both "reality-based'' and overtly "fictional" material may be structured
according to similar formal principles or ideological premises. This view has been
a common feature in criticism of the more traditional forms of reality-based
material--for example, documentaries (Linton, 1992) and ethnographic films
(Hansen et al., 1991)-and it is not surprising to encounter it in examinations of
current practices (Campbell and Freed, 1993; Cavender and Bond-Maupin, 1995;
Kozloff, 1992). Nevertheless, from the perspective of this discussion what counts
is whether labels such as ''documentary" or "fiction" still matter to viewers.
Research on this point will be reviewed below in an examination of openly
fictional film and television.
The Selectivity of Photographic Representation
As has already been noted, the one form of visual control that no reality-based
presentation can avoid is the selection of what to show. In fact, this is essentially a
tautological observation, and to a certain extent the issue of visual selection may be
too obvious to need much discussion. Still, a brief look at some examples of the
considerable consequences of selectivity may be useful. It is also worth noting that
what is obviously in principle is not always obvious to viewers in practice.
Given its inevitability, the selectivity of the news camera was the principal
focus of an early, paradigmatic study of potential misinformation in TV news
(Lang and Lang, 1952). The study dealt with television's presentation of an event
related to the Korean War: General Douglas MacArthur's visit to Chicago after he
was abruptly dismissed from his command by President Truman. A systematic
comparison between the televised images of MacArthur's reception and the reports
of trained on-site observers showed that television had selectively emphasized
images of enthusiasm on the part of the public, giving an impression of strong
support for MacArthur that did not correspond to the direct, on-site reports. This
study illustrates that deciding what constitutes misleading selectivity is not always
a simple matter. In contrast to the cases of alteration and staging, here there can be
no absolute standard of non-intervention. All the same, the pattern observed in the
study had definite implications: Since the confrontation between MacArthur and
Truman was part of a broader political conflict regarding the conduct of the war,
television's role in this incident cannot be dismissed as simply an attempt to keep
viewers interested (even if that was the actual motivation for the way the event was
covered).
A characteristic contemporary example of the potential consequences of
visual selectivity has been given by Larry Gross (1988). Gross' analysis of news
images of lesbian and gay marches and political gatherings suggests that television

coverage of such events has tended to feature those participants whose appearance
is most likely to draw a negative reaction from hostile viewers. A similar point has
been made by Parenti, referring to news photographs of antiwar protests:
"Individual demonstrators who convey a kooky appearance will more likely catch
the camera's eye than those of more conventional deportment, the purpose of such
photographs being not only to highlight the unusual but to delegitimate the
protesters, making them the issue rather than the thing they are protesting" (1986,
p. 224).
Under the heading of selectivity, it may also be appropriate to consider
briefly one aspect of the imagery appearing in news reports of the Persian Gulf
War. A prominent feature of these reports was the repeated display of pictures of
"smart bombs" being guided precisely onto their targets. The pictures may have
"created an illusion of remote, bloodless, pushbutton battle in which only military
targets were assumed destroyed" (Walker, 1992, p. 84). However, subsequent
reports indicate that, "of all bombs dropped on Iraq, only seven percent were socalled smart bombs, and of these at most 70 percent were thought to have hit their
intended targets" (Lee and Solomon, 1990, p. xx). Furthermore, it appears that Iraq
experienced substantial civilian casualties, especially in Basra (Walker, 1992, pp.
87-88; see also Sifry and Cerf, 1991, p. 336n). In short, the selectiveness of the
smart-bomb images may have misled viewers about one of the war's most serious
consequences. (Whether public knowledge about this discrepancy would have
made much difference at the time is another matter; see Jowett, 1993.)
In all of these examples, then, the potential implications are substantial, but
the source of those implications is conceptually simple: pointing the camera in one
direction instead of another, picking one video clip out of a number of alternatives.
In principle, therefore, alertness to the possibility of this kind of visual
misinformation should also be a relatively straightforward matter. This does not
mean that viewers should necessarily be expected to display greater alertness in
this area than in any of the others we have examined so far. What it does mean,
however, is that lack of alertness in this area cannot be attributed to the complexity
of the means of manipulation.
THE ILLUSION OF REALITY IN VISUAL FICTION
Analyses of the ideological implications of fictional TV programs and films
usually deal with thematic content and plot structure rather than with visual
composition or editing. However, in one area of ideological analysis, visual
variables have played a central role. This area is directly concerned with viewers'
awareness of manipulation; it deals with the visual devices through which viewers
are encouraged to overlook the ficticity of films and TV programs and to succumb

to an illusion of reality. Much recent writing in this area reflects the influence of
work done in cinema studies in the 1970s. The theoretical formulations that came
out of that work have been modified, extended, or attacked in various ways over
the years, but they still figure centrally in current scholarship, if only as a
counterpoint to subsequent developments. The discussion that follows will take
these original formulations as starting points and refer to more recent arguments
where appropriate. It can be said at the outset, though, that while these latter
arguments have tended to question the potency of the ideological effects posited by
the earlier theorists, they have been less likely to challenge the intricacy of those
theorists’ models of the ideological process.
A common-sense assumption about cinematic realism is that it encourages
viewers to accept the messages that movies may contain. This assumption is at the
core of a more expansive conception of realism and ideology developed by such
writers as Baudry (1975), Heath (1981), Metz (1982), Oudart (1978), and
Silverman (1983), among others. In the hands of these writers, the core assumption
was extended through a variety of elaborations, whose thrust may be summarized
as follows: Mainstream Hollywood cinema is characterized by certain stylistic
features that serve to suppress the viewer's awareness of ficticity and artifice; this
suppression of awareness occurs in parallel with a lapse into a regressive
psychological state, in which the viewer identifies with the screen image,
experiencing it as her/his own creation; by virtue of experiencing the movie as if
she/he were its author, the viewer comes to accept the ideological premises that
shaped the movie as if they were her/his own.
What should one make of these assumptions? To begin with, it is certainly
true that in certain respects mainstream movies are typically designed to look
"realistic." Most obviously, perhaps, this has to do with such matters as costuming
and set design -- he surface appearance of a film or TV program. Hollywood lore
contains any number of stories about the lengths to which filmmakers have gone in
pursuit of realism in this sense. For example, one of Alfred Hitchcock’s former
assistants recalls being sent out to study ''exactly" how car salesmen were dressed
in a certain part of the country, so that Hitchcock could replicate that look in
Psycho (Rebello, 1990, p. 56; see also Truffaut, 1967, p. 192).
Mainstream cinema can also be considered realistic in another sense. As
filmmakers themselves often acknowledge most fictional genres (in both film and
television) have traditionally tended to avoid the use of stylistic devices that might
draw attention to style at the expense of content. This point was expressed by
Ralph Rosenblum, a prominent editor: "Regardless of its extent or style, editing
should not impress or call attention to itself. As an audience, we no more want to
see the wheels and gears and levers responsible for the effect the film is having on
us than we want to set the pencil marks on an author's tint draft or the invisible

wires in a magic show" (Rosenblum and Karen, 1979, p. 296). Once again, the case
of Psycho provides a useful illustration: In a murder scene that takes place on a
staircase. Hitchcock wanted to use an overhead camera angle (pointing straight
down) to conceal the face of the killer. But he was concerned that a direct cut to
such a relatively unusual angle would be obtrusive. His solution was to have the
camera rise in tandem with a character walking up the stairs, thus ''naturalizing" the
eventual high angle (Truffaut. 1967, p. 208). In other words, the more general aim
in this kind of situation is to give the impression that camerawork and editing are
simply flowing from the actions and thoughts of characters inside the narrative,
instead of being controlled by external intentions.
It is this aspect of cinematic realism that is, the "suppression" of evidence of
artifice-that became the principal focus of the theoretical framework outlined
above. However, rather than seeing this suppression as a matter of merely
occasional significance, tied to instances in which the likelihood that a film might
give itself away is particularly high (as in Psycho), this theoretical framework has
treated the process of suppressing awareness as a central component of movies'
effects on viewers. To put it differently, it has been assumed that threats to the
illusion of reality are regular features of cinematic structure, not isolated cases. A
detailed attempt to derive this assumption from an analysis of Hollywood editing
conventions is contained in an influential article by Oudart (1978) and a related
piece by Dayan (1974). Oudart's argument deals with the shot/reverse-shot
principle of shooting and editing, according to which an off-screen look by a
character in one shot is followed by a matching look from a character in the next
shot, so that the viewer gets a sense of a continuous interaction. This is probably
the most common form of editing in most fictional genres. According to Oudart, a
single off-screen look, without the matching look from the next shot, would
threaten the illusion of reality. It would alert the viewer to the space outside the
movie frame--a space that contains the movie projector, as well as the viewer
her/himself. But the viewer's awareness of this space is averted when the off-screen
look is provided with a target inside the world of the movie, namely, the character
in the matching, reverse-angle shot.
Discussions of this argument have sometimes treated it as an autonomous set
of statements about the viewing experience (see Rothman, 1975), but in Oudart's
work it was intimately connected to the psychoanalytic assumptions that have
constituted another major component of this line of scholarship. The essential
element in these assumptions is the idea that the process of movie viewing is
analogous to-and, indeed, recapitulates-the infantile experience of gaining a sense
of self-mastery through identification with another person (or with a mirror image
of the infant's own body). According to this idea, the disruption produced by the
off-screen look is analogous to the infant's experience of lack when it becomes

aware of an external, superior source of order. The matching shot's effect in
countering the off-screen look recapitulates the infant's internalization of the
dictates of the social order.
Clearly this conceptual model does not leave much room for critical or even
reflective viewership. In the words of another of the principal architects of this
model, when viewers are watching a movie, "whether they know it or not (but they
do not), [they] find themselves chained, captured, or captivated" (Baudry, 1975, p.
309). The inflexibility of this view was a major point of disagreement as the media
scholarship of the 1980s moved towards a conception of active, resisting viewers
(Gaines, 1992). By and large, subsequent scholarship has also discarded the
"dizzying array of analogies" through which the model sought to make its
psychoanalytic claims (Mayne, 1993, p. 46). The most sustained refutation of those
claims comes from Carroll (1988); several writers have turned to cognitive
psychology, and to an image of active sense-making, as alternatives to the
psychoanalytic conception of the viewing process (for example, Anderson, 1993;
Bordwell, 1985; Branigan, 1992).
In fact, however, psychoanalytic analogies are not an essential element of
theories about the ideological implications of cinematic realism. The core
assumption of these theories-i.e., the notion that a naturalistic visual style makes a
movie's ideological premises also seem natural--can stand on its own, without any
psychoanalytic underpinnings. This more basic view of stylistic naturalism is
expressed succinctly by Roben Ray: ''The ideological power of Classic
Hollywood's procedure is obvious: under its sponsorship, even the most
manufactured narratives came to seem spontaneous and 'real' '' (Ray, 1985, p. 55).
This kind of view of the relationship between style and ideology has enjoyed much
greater staying power than the earlier psychoanalytic formulations. A current
version is set forth systematically by Bruce Kawin (1992), in a popular textbook on
film theory. Kawin argues that the compositional and editing devices developed by
the movie industry are nothing but arbitrary conventions; that moviemakers have
nevertheless succeeded in conditioning viewers to overlook this arbitrariness and
to respond to movies as if they were natural events; and that this concealment of
stylistic authorship serves to conceal the arbitrariness of movies' ideological
content (Kawin, 1992, p. 50ff).
Kawin's argument could be strengthened by the observation that the stylistic
codes of mainstream fiction films and TV programs are not entirely arbitrary and
are often modelled on principles of real-world visual perception (Messaris, 1994).
Even in its present form, however, the argument is not very different from what
could probably be considered the "common-sense" view of these matters--namely,
that stylistic realism makes viewers more susceptible to a movie's effects. Perhaps

because of its commonsensical quality, this view is rarely challenged directly (see
Carroll, 1988). Nevertheless, it should not be taken entirely for granted.
Some evidence that could be seen as supporting this view comes from a
recent study by Mares (1994). Mares showed viewers movie excerpts and news
clips about similar subjects and then asked them to recall which incidents had
occurred in which of the two formats. Viewers who mistakenly remembered the
fictional material as if it had occurred in the news were more likely to have high
scores on a "cultivation index" (derived from Gerbner and Gross's Cultural
Indicators project), indicative of agreement with television's perspective on reality
(presumed to be relatively monolithic). If these viewers' post-facto confusion
between movies and news can be taken as evidence of an analogous confusion
between fiction and reality while they were actually watching this material, the
results of this study can be read as confirming the common-sense view about the
ideological consequences of the illusion of reality. On the other hand, however, it
is entirely conceivable that the viewers' misattributions resulted only from faulty
memory, not earlier confusion. Furthermore, it is possible that the best way to
interpret these results is to reverse the direction of causality: People whose views
coincide with television's perspectives on reality may be more likely to attribute
those perspectives to the news than to fiction.
A different way of testing the commonsense view of illusionism is to
examine one of its corollaries, namely, the idea that a representational style which
violates the illusion of reality should lead to greater awareness of ideology. This
idea’s emergence in film scholarship was partly an extension of analogous notions
about the theater, particularly the work of Berrolt Brecht (Eisaesser, 1990). In film
scholarship, the idea has led to an interest in movies that deliberately call attention
to their artificiality by breaking standard conventions and/or by openly showing or
referring to the movie-making process (see Hedges, 1991; Stam, 1992). Messaris
(1981) studied viewers' reactions to such devices using a film that included scenes
about its own production and that violated several editing conventions. Despite
these "anti-illusionistic" devices, the general tendency in the viewers' responses
was to treat the film in terms of story progression and character motivation, rather
than authorial intent.
Doubts about any necessary connection between stylistic anti-illusionism
and ideological awareness have also been raised in studies of two fictional genres
that routinely deviate from some of the conventions of illusionistic narration. In
particular, Jane Feuer (1982) has observed that Hollywood musicals often employ
a variety of "self-reflexive" devices (references to show business, to other
musicals, to the audience, etc.) without any concomitant departure from a
"conservative" social orientation. Mimi White (1992) has argued that selfreferentiality in TV situation comedies (for example, Bob Newhart dreaming in

one show of a character he had played on another show) serves to strengthen the
affective and intellectual appeal of television fiction, rather than subverting its
message.
More generally, then, it seems appropriate to take a skeptical stance towards
the conventional equation between stylistic unobtrusiveness and ideological
efficacy. However, even if one were to accept this equation uncritically, one might
still want to question the centrality it has been accorded in discussions of viewers'
confrontations with the screen. As noted earlier, it is only at relatively rare
moments (for example, in movies like Psycho) that the concealment of artistic
devices becomes an active ingredient of mainstream film style. It may be true that
ordinary viewers do not ordinarily attend to the structural characteristics of
camerawork, editing, etc., but tacitness of message structure is not the same thing
as deliberate concealment. Moreover, if it is the apparent realism of movies that is
at issue in this line of cinema scholarship, one could also ask why more attention
has not been paid to viewers' attitudes toward the physical world on the screen. The
achievement of realism in this area is a common, sometimes major, preoccupation
in both film and TV production (as in the example from Psycho mentioned above).
Yet scholarly interest in these matters has usually been slight.
In effect, what has happened here is that the attainment of "literate" viewing
has been envisioned as a contest against a hidden foe--even though that foe's active
attempts at self-concealment are arguably rare, and despite the presence of a more
common alternative antagonist. This way of formulating the viewers' task is similar
to conceptions encountered earlier in this article, in connection with advertising
and with informational uses of images.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has reviewed theoretical accounts of what viewers are up against in
their confrontations with manipulative or misleading images. The review began by
summarizing empirical findings on viewers' awareness of camera angle, subjective
camera, and associational juxtaposition. All three are frequently found in visual
advertising (in fact, the third is probably the most common tool of visual
persuasion). All three have been found to affect viewers' responses to persuasive
images. All three appear to operate outside of the conscious awareness of many
viewers—even though all of these devices are based on relatively simple
conceptual principles. Nonetheless, much theoretical and critical discussion of
visual advertising has painted a picture of manipulative devices that are highly
complex or elaborately devious--even though some of these devices may be
entirely absent from mass-media advertising.

The second area examined in this review had to do with potentially
misleading images in the news media. Recent academic and journalistic criticism
in this area has dealt extensively with the alteration of photographs by means of
digital imaging technology, and with the use of staging or simulation in TV news.
Critics of these practices commonly predict that their widespread use may lead to
an erosion of public faith in photographic media. However, a third source of
potential visual misinformation--namely, the simple fact that all images are
selective--is already an inevitable, but less discussed, feature of any informational
use of photographic media.
The article's final section was an overview of theoretical arguments about
the relationship in fictional narratives between visual style and ideology. The
traditional notion about this relationship is that mainstream movies tend to conceal
their artificiality from the viewer, and that this concealment fosters an impression
of reality which serves to "naturalize" these movies' ideological premises. In
addition to questioning the connections envisioned in this notion, this review
suggested that the concealment of artifice may not play as central a role in
mainstream movie style as commonly assumed. There may be other, more
pervasive sources for viewers' impression of reality.
One of the points of this review has been that much of the scholarly and
journalistic literature has tended to focus on relatively complex and elusive forms
of visual manipulation, while paying less attention to simpler, less-devious--but
also, arguably, much more common--practices. It may be appropriate to end with
some speculations about possible consequences of this pattern for viewers, for
media practitioners, and for the critics and scholars from whose writings the
pattern has emerged.
It could be argued that the critics' emphasis on the more devious forms of
visual manipulation or deception may have contributed to a highlighting of public
skepticism towards the visual media--a consequence that may be welcomed or
deplored, depending on one's own perspective. On the other hand, this critical
tendency may also be seen in a rather different light. From the point of view of the
producers of mass-media images, the critics' emphasis on the arcane and the
recondite may not be entirely unwelcome, if it deflects attention away from certain
more commonplace practices. For example, advertisers themselves will
occasionally bring up the subject of subliminal advertising, since they can
truthfully deny using such techniques (see Ogilvy, 1983, p. 209). More
significantly, news organizations' vehement stands against computer alterations of
images may convey an air of objectivity that might be less easy to justify if the
critical focus were to shift to other news practices (cf. Lee and Solomon, 1990, p.
336).

It may also be pertinent to point out that the critical emphases summarized
above have coincided, in recent years, with a tendency among media scholars to
conceptualize audiences as active and resisting. Some research conducted in this
spirit has drawn attention to audience behavior in which the element of resistance
is indeed clear (for example, readers who sent copies of sexist ads to Ms.
magazine's ''No Comment" section; see Steiner, 1988). It seems fair to say,
however, that in other cases the construction of the resisting viewer owes much to
the researcher's own predispositions. Judith Mayne observes a strong tendency
toward constituting a viewer who is always resisting, always struggling, always
seemingly just on the verge of becoming the embodiment of the researcher's own
political ideal" (Mayne, 1993, p. 61). In other words, viewers often fail to attain the
researcher's own ideal, despite having been conceptualized as active.
This aspect of current media scholarship seems particularly relevant to the
conceptions of visual literacy examined in this review. More specifically, the
emphasis on the more baroque forms of visual manipulation can be seen as a way
of rationalizing the failure of supposedly resisting viewers to attain the insights of
the researcher. Conceptualizing visual literacy as an almost impossible challenge
may serve to uphold the supposition that viewers would share the researcher’s
perspective if only they could.
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